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WAR	  CRIMES	  TRIALS:	  	  
BETWEEN	  JUSTICE	  AND	  POLITICS	  
Devin	  O.	  Pendas	  *	  
ALLAN	   A.	   RYAN,	   YAMASHITA’S	   GHOST:	   WAR	   CRIMES,	   MACARTHUR’S	   JUSTICE,	   AND	  COMMAND	  ACCOUNTABILITY	  (2012).	  Pp.	  416.	  Hardcover	  $34.95.	  	  CHARLES	  ANTHONY	  SMITH,	  THE	  RISE	  AND	  FALL	  OF	  WAR	  CRIMES	  TRIALS:	  FROM	  CHARLES	  I	  TO	  BUSH	  II	  (2012).	  Pp.	  328.	  Hardcover	  $103.00.	  	  	  Few	   international	   developments	   in	   the	   twentieth-­‐century	   are	  more	   striking	  than	  the	  increasing	  use	  of	  law	  to	  punish	  perpetrators	  of	  mass	  violence,	  whether	  war	  crimes,	  crimes	  against	  humanity,	  or	  genocide.	  While	  war	  crimes	  prosecutions	  have	  occurred	  in	  earlier	  time	  periods,	  such	  trials	  were	  rare	  and	  often	  of	  dubious	  quality.	  For	   instance,	   in	   the	   first	  known	  war	  crimes	  trial	   in	  1305,	   the	  English	  executed	  Sir	  William	  Wallace	   (of	  Braveheart	   fame)	   “for	  waging	   a	  war	   of	   extermination	   against	  the	   English	   population,	   ‘sparing	   neither	   age	   nor	   sex,	  monk	   nor	   nun.’”1	   Of	   course,	  whatever	  his	  military	  conduct,	  Wallace’s	  true	  crime,	  and	  the	  reason	  for	  his	  prosecu-­‐tion,	  was	  treason,	  not	  war	  crimes.	  Moreover,	  he	  was	  subjected	  to	  extensive	  judicial	  torture,	  something	  we	  would	  today	  consider	  to	  be	  criminal	  in	  and	  of	  itself.	  For	  cen-­‐turies,	   the	   laws	   of	  war	  were	   largely	   a	  matter	   of	   custom,	   though	   royal	   ordinances	  were	  sometimes	  issued	  for	  specific	  military	  campaigns	  in	  medieval	  Europe.2	  Conse-­‐quently,	  the	  trials	  that	  occurred	  varied	  considerably	  in	  both	  the	  crimes	  prosecuted	  and	  the	  procedures	  followed.	  Therefore,	  despite	  scattered	  antecedents,	  it	  makes	  lit-­‐tle	  sense	  to	  speak	  of	  “war	  crimes	  trials”	  as	  a	  general	  phenomenon	  before	  the	  mod-­‐ern	  period.	  In	  the	  nineteenth	  century,	  the	  United	  States	  took	  the	  lead	  in	  formally	  codifying	  the	  laws	  of	  war	  with	  the	  Lieber	  Code	  of	  1863,	  promulgated	  shortly	  before	  the	  First	  Geneva	  Convention	  of	  1864.3	  Of	  course,	  at	  about	   that	  same	  time,	   the	  U.S.	  was	  also	  prosecuting	  Native	  Americans	  for	  killing	  women	  and	  children	  while	  defending	  their	  lands	   in	   Minnesota;	   out	   of	   an	   initial	   list	   of	   300,	   thirty-­‐three	   were	   eventually	  hanged.4	   One	   scholar	   has	   observed	   of	   this	   incident:	   “[t]his	   early	   attempt	   to	   apply	  
                                                            	   *	   Associate	  Professor,	  Department	  of	  History,	  Boston	  College.	  	  	  	   1.	  	   John	  H.E.	   Fried,	  War	   Crimes	   Violate	   the	   Laws	   of	  War,	   in	  WAR	   CRIMES	   13,	   16	   (Henry	  H.	   Kim	   ed.,	  2000).	  	   2.	  	   THEODOR	  MERON,	  WAR	  CRIMES	  LAW	  COMES	  OF	  AGE:	  ESSAYS	  1-­‐2	  (1998).	  	   3.	  	   JOHN	  FABIAN	  WITT,	  LINCOLN’S	  CODE:	  THE	  LAWS	  OF	  WAR	  IN	  AMERICAN	  HISTORY	  2-­‐4	  (2012).	  	  	   4.	  	   LARRY	  MCMURTRY,	  CUSTER	  43	  (2012).	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law	  to	  war	  (even	  though	  the	  U.S.	  government	  did	  not	  consider	  the	  ongoing	  battles	  with	  the	  Indians	  a	  war)	  produced	  a	  primitive	  form	  of	  political	  justice	  .	  .	  .	  .”5	  Whether	  the	   formalizing	   initiative	  of	   the	  Lieber	  Code	  compensated	   for	   the	  barely	  disguised	  lynchings	  in	  Minnesota	  is	  debatable.	  Although	  the	  trend	  toward	  codification	  contin-­‐ued	  with	  the	  Hague	  Conventions	  of	  1899	  and	  1907,	  it	   is	  clear	  that	  before	  the	  mid-­‐twentieth	  century,	  the	  laws	  of	  war,	  although	  developing,	  remained	  underspecified,	  and	  enforcement	  was	  arbitrary	  and	  inconsistent	  at	  best.6	  Above	  all,	  the	  laws	  of	  war,	  whether	  customary	  or	  codified,	  were	  seen	   in	   this	  era	  of	   imperialism	  as	  pertaining	  only	   to	   conflicts	   between	   “civilized”	   nations.7	   Being	   civilized	  meant,	   among	   other	  things,	  having	  an	   identifiable	  and	   internationally	  recognized	  state,	  having	  a	  stand-­‐ing,	  uniformed	  military,	  and	  fighting	  in	  a	  manner	  consistent	  with	  European	  norms	  (e.g.,	  in	  open	  battle,	  rather	  than	  raids).8	  It	  should	  be	  clear	  that	  this	  understanding	  of	  “civilization”	  was	  deeply	   racialized	   and,	  more	  or	   less,	   overtly	   intended	   to	   exclude	  colonized	  peoples.9	  In	   the	   second	  part	  of	   the	   twentieth	  century,	   the	   sporadic	  and	   largely	  ad	  hoc	  application	  of	  the	  laws	  of	  war	  began	  to	  change,	  starting	  with	  the	  International	  Mili-­‐tary	  Tribunal	  and	  the	  American-­‐led	  successor	  tribunals	  at	  Nuremberg.10	  Thereafter,	  starting	  as	  early	  as	  the	  1970s	  and	  clearly	  picking	  up	  steam	  in	  the	  1990s,	  it	  became	  increasingly	   common	   to	   prosecute	   perpetrators	   of	   wartime	   atrocities	   and	   other	  forms	  of	  mass	  political	  violence	  in	  a	  process	  that	  Kathryn	  Sikkink	  has	  termed	  “the	  justice	  cascade.”11	  These	  prosecutions	  have	  proceeded	  in	  both	  domestic	  and	  inter-­‐national	  courts.12	  Famously,	  the	  United	  Nations	  created	  a	  permanent	  International	  Criminal	   Court	   (“ICC”)	   in	   1998	   in	   Rome	   (with	   the	   court	   coming	   into	   existence	   in	  2002)	  and,	  just	  as	  famously,	  the	  United	  States	  declined	  to	  join	  the	  court,	  with	  Presi-­‐dent	  George	  W.	  Bush	  even	  going	   so	   far	   as	   to	   “unsign”	   the	  Rome	  Treaty.13	  Despite	  U.S.	  opposition	  (as	  well	  as	  that	  of	  China	  and	  Russia),	  the	  ICC	  has	  established	  itself	  as	  a	  functioning	  element	  of	  international	  governance.14	  Enshrined	  in	  the	  Rome	  Statute	  is	   the	   jurisdictional	   doctrine	   of	   “complementarity,”	   which	   gives	   domestic	   courts	  first	   crack	   at	   the	  mass	   crimes	   under	   the	   ICC’s	   jurisdiction,	   thus	   formalizing	   joint	  domestic	   and	   international	   jurisdiction	   for	   war	   crimes,	   crimes	   against	   humanity,	  genocide,	  and	  (eventually)	  aggression.15	  As	  the	  christening	  of	  this	  trend	  as	  a	  “justice	  cascade”	  implies,	  these	  twentieth	  century	  developments	  have	  often	  been	  treated	  as	  unambiguously	  positive,	  serving	  the	   general	   goal	   of	   seeing	   justice	  done	   in	   the	  world	   and	   aiding	   in	  political	   transi-­‐
                                                            	   5.	  	   PETER	  MAGUIRE,	  LAW	  AND	  WAR:	  INTERNATIONAL	  LAW	  AND	  AMERICAN	  HISTORY	  29	  (2001).	  	   6.	  	   Fried,	  supra	  note	  1,	  at	  16.	  	  	   7.	  	   Devin	  O.	  Pendas,	  The	  Magical	  Scent	  of	  the	  Savage:	  Colonial	  Violence,	  the	  Crisis	  of	  Civilization,	  and	  
the	  Origins	  of	  the	  Legalist	  Paradigm	  of	  War,	  30	  B.C.	  Int'l	  &	  Comp.	  L.	  Rev.	  29,	  34-­‐36	  (2007).	  
 8.  GERRIT W. GONG, THE STANDARD OF “CIVILIZATION” IN INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY 14-19 (1984). 	   9.	  	   Id.	  at	  21-­‐22.	  	   10.	  	   GEOFFREY	  BEST,	  WAR	  AND	  LAW	  SINCE	  1945,	  at	  67-­‐69	  (1994).	  	  	   11.	  	   KATHRYN	   SIKKINK,	   THE	   JUSTICE	   CASCADE:	   HOW	   HUMAN	   RIGHTS	   PROSECUTIONS	   ARE	   CHANGING	   WORLD	  POLITICS	  5	  (2011).	  	  	   12.	  	   BENJAMIN	  N.	  SCHIFF,	  BUILDING	  THE	  INTERNATIONAL	  CRIMINAL	  COURT	  76-­‐77	  (2008).	  	   13.	  	   Id.	  at	  167-­‐81.	  	   14.	  	   Id.	  at	  168.	  	   15.	  	   Id.	  at	  115-­‐17.	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tions	   from	   authoritarian	   to	  more	   democratic	   and	   liberal	   regimes.16	   Consequently,	  such	  prosecutions	  are	  often	  lumped	  together	  with	  other	  judicial-­‐political	  processes,	  such	   as	   lustration	   and	   truth	   commissions,	   under	   the	   rubric	   of	   “transitional	   jus-­‐tice.”17	  This	  historical	   trajectory	  has	  often	  been	   framed	  as	   a	  move	   from	   impunity,	  where	  political	   actors	   in	  wartime	  could	   literally	  get	   away	  with	  murder,	   to	   justice,	  where	  at	   least	  major	  perpetrators	  will	  be	  held	  accountable	  and	  punished	  for	  their	  crimes.18	   On	   this	   view,	   although	   acknowledging	   the	   limitations	   and	   ongoing	   chal-­‐lenges	   for	   justice,	   the	   trend	   toward	   criminal	   prosecutions	   for	   broadly	   construed	  human	  rights	  violations	  is	  seen	  as	  a	  clear	  improvement.	  According	  to	  Sikkink:	  	  	   The	  possibility	   of	   individual	   criminal	   accountability	   has	  provided	  useful	   but	   imperfect	   tools	   to	   activists,	   victims,	   and	   states	   to	   help	  diminish	   future	   violations.	   These	   human	   rights	   prosecutions	  will	  continue	  to	  fall	  far	  short	  of	  our	  ideals	  of	  justice,	  but	  they	  represent	  an	   improvement	  over	   the	  past	   .	   .	   .	   .	  The	  new	  world	  of	  greater	  ac-­‐countability	   that	  we	  are	  entering	  now,	   for	   all	   its	  problems,	  offers	  hope	  of	  reducing	  violence	  in	  the	  world.19	  	  The	  underlying	  logic	  of	  this	  cautiously	  optimistic	  interpretation	  of	  the	  history	  of	  war	  crimes	  trials	  is	  twofold.	  First,	  there	  is	  the	  empirical	  claim	  that	  criminal	  pros-­‐ecutions	  for	  political	  atrocities	  have	  beneficial	  effects,	  in	  the	  form	  of	  deterrence	  and	  democratization.20	   This	   is	   the	   crux	   of	   Sikkink’s	   argument.	   Her	   evidence	   comes	  mainly	   from	  Latin	  America;	   she	  argues	   that	   “countries	   in	  Latin	  America	   that	  used	  human	  rights	  prosecutions	  have	  better	  human	  rights	  records	  than	  countries	  in	  the	  region	  that	  did	  not	  use	  such	  prosecutions,	  or	  used	  them	  less	  frequently.”21	  This	  may	  well	  be	  true,	  statistically	  speaking,	  but	   it	  does	  raise	  an	   important	  “chicken	  or	  egg”	  question.	  Perhaps	  countries	  more	  inclined	  to	  protect	  human	  rights	  are	  those	  more	  likely	  to	  stage	  prosecutions	  for	  human	  rights	  abuses,	  and	  not	  the	  other	  way	  around.	  Be	  that	  as	  it	  may,	  the	  second	  underlying	  claim	  of	  the	  optimists’	  position	  seems	  more	  consequential.	   This	   is	   that	   normalizing	   prosecutions	   for	   human	   rights	   violations	  and	  war	  crimes	  may	  help	  to	  diminish	  levels	  of	  mass	  violence	  and	  atrocity	  generally	  by	   spreading	   human	   rights	   norms	   and	  helping	   to	   (re)constitute	   the	   rule	   of	   law.22	  This	  is	  less	  an	  argument	  about	  deterrence	  than	  about	  the	  spread	  of	  cultural	  norms.	  Many	  scholars	  are	  skeptical	  of	   this	  optimistic	  account.	   23	  Typically,	   the	  skep-­‐tics	  of	  trials	  for	  mass	  atrocities	  argue	  from	  a	  position	  of	  international	  relations	  “re-­‐
                                                            	   16.	  	   See	  generally	  	  SIKKINK,	  supra	  note	  11.	  	   17.	  	   RUTI	  G.	  TEITEL,	  TRANSITIONAL	  JUSTICE	  223-­‐24	  (2000).	  	   18.	  	   YVES	   BEIGBEDER,	   INTERNATIONAL	   JUSTICE	   AGAINST	   IMPUNITY:	   PROGRESS	   AND	   NEW	   CHALLENGES	   226-­‐27	  (2005).	  	   19.	  	   SIKKINK,	  supra	  note	  11,	  at	  262.	  	  	   20.	  	   Id.	  at	  148-­‐50,	  169-­‐70.	  	  	   21.	  	   Id.	  at	  167.	  	   22.	  	   Id.	  at	  169-­‐74.	  	   23.	  	   	  See	  Donald	  Bloxham	  &	  Devin	  O.	  Pendas,	  Punishment	  as	  Prevention?	  The	  Politics	  of	  Prosecuting	  Gé-­‐
nocidaires,	   in	   THE	   OXFORD	   HANDBOOK	   OF	   GENOCIDE	   STUDIES	  617	   (Donald	   Bloxham	  &	   A.	   Dirk	  Moses	   eds.,	  2010).	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alism.”24	  At	   its	  most	  basic,	  according	  to	  this	  perspective,	   the	   international	  arena	  is	  characterized	  by	  an	  “absence	  of	  an	  arbitrator	  or	  laws,”	  which	  means	  that	  “war	  [is]	  a	  possibility.”25	  Accordingly,	  international	  law	  is	  seen	  as	  nearly	  an	  oxymoron.	  It	  calls	  fundamentally	   into	  question	  the	  notion	  that	   international	   legalism	  will	  have	  a	  sig-­‐nificant	  impact	  on	  state	  actors.	  To	  the	  extent	  that	  states	  obey	  international	  law,	  they	  do	  so	  because	  such	  compliance	   is	  seen	  as	  cheap	  and	  as	  consonant	  with	  the	  state’s	  preconceived	  interests.	  As	  Jack	  Goldsmith	  and	  Eric	  Posner	  put	  it:	  “International	  law	  emerges	   from	  states’	   pursuit	   of	   self-­‐interested	  policies	   on	   the	   international	   stage.	  International	  law	  is,	  in	  this	  sense,	  endogenous	  to	  state	  interests.	  It	  is	  not	  a	  check	  on	  state	  self-­‐interest;	  it	  is	  a	  product	  of	  state	  self-­‐interest.”26	  This	  realist	  skepticism	  has	  its	  own	  limitations,	  however.	  For	  one	  thing,	  the	  de-­‐velopment	  of	   criminal	  prosecutions	   for	  past	  atrocities	  has	   taken	  place	  as	  much	   in	  domestic	  courts	  as	   it	  has	  before	   international	   tribunals,	   so	   the	  realist’s	  account	  of	  self-­‐interested	   states	   acting	   in	   an	   anomic	   international	   arena	   is	   rather	   beside	   the	  point	  for	  major	  dimensions	  of	  the	  history	  of	  war	  crimes	  trials.	  Moreover,	  the	  vision	  of	   an	   anarchic	   international	   sphere	  where	   states	   pursue	   self-­‐evident	   geostrategic	  interests	  greatly	  underplays	  the	  role	  of	  ideology;	  which	  is	  odd,	  especially	  when	  talk-­‐ing	  about	   the	  twentieth	  century	  where	  the	  significance	  of	   ideology	  would	  seem	  to	  be	  self-­‐evident.	  In	  particular,	  it	  tends	  to	  treat	  the	  notion	  of	  “national	  interest”	  as	  an	  a	  priori	  given,	  rather	   than	  a	  historically	  emergent	  category,	  with	  variable	  content.	  States	  view	  their	  interests	  differently	  over	  time,	  and	  there	  is	  no	  reason	  to	  think	  that	  obedience	   to,	  and	  enforcement	  of,	   international	  norms	  cannot	  sometimes	  come	  to	  be	  viewed	  as	  a	  compelling	  state	  interest.	  Of	  course,	  this	  implies	  that	  the	  reverse	  can	  be	  true	  as	  well	  and	  that	  states	  may	  also	  lose	  interest	  in	  international	  law	  over	  time.	  For	  instance,	  under	  its	  recent	  conservative	  government,	  Canada	  has	  abandoned	  its	  former	   leadership	   role	   as	   a	  member	   of	   the	   “coalition	   of	   the	   willing”	   that	   led	   the	  push	  for	  creating	  the	  ICC,	  and	  has	  adopted	  a	  more	  U.S.-­‐style	  skepticism	  of	  interna-­‐tional	   legal	   institutions.27	   Yet,	   it	   is	   hard	   to	   see	   that	   anything	   fundamental	   has	  changed	  about	  Canada’s	  actual	  strategic	  interests;	  the	  shift	  has	  been	  an	  ideological	  one.	   So	  rather	  than	  naturalizing	  some	  notion	  of	  state	   interest,	   I	  would	  suggest	  al-­‐ternative	  grounds	  for	  skepticism	  regarding	  the	  potential	  of	  war	  crimes	  trials	  to	  ef-­‐fect	   social	   and	   political	   change.	   The	   optimists	   overstate	   their	   case	   for	   what	   war	  crimes	   trials	   can	  achieve	  because	   they	   tend	   to	  misapprehend	   the	   relationship	  be-­‐tween	  law	  and	  politics.	  (Politics	  is	  being	  conceived	  broadly	  here	  as	  the	  social	  organ-­‐ization	  of	  power	  relations).	  The	  optimists	  see	  criminal	  prosecution	  as	  a	  means	  for	  taming	  mass	  violence	  through	  the	  application	  of	  law.	  The	  analogy	  is	  to	  the	  process	  whereby	  states	   came	   to	   first	   claim,	   then	   to	  actually	  operationalize,	   a	  monopoly	  of	  legitimate	  force	  in	  the	  domestic	  sphere;	  the	  notion	  being	  that	  something	  analogous	  
                                                            	   24.	  	   	  Paradigmatically,	  see	  JACK	  L.	  GOLDSMITH	  &	  ERIC	  POSNER,	  THE	  LIMITS	  OF	  INTERNATIONAL	  LAW	  (2006).	  	  	   25.	  	   RAYMOND	  ARON,	  PEACE	  AND	  WAR:	  A	  THEORY	  OF	  INTERNATIONAL	  RELATIONS	  51	  (1966).	  	  	   26.	  	   GOLDSMITH	  &	  POSNER,	  supra	  note	  24,	  at	  13.	  	   27.	  	   Ryan	   Liss	  &	   Joanna	   Langille,	   It’s	   Not	   Just	   the	   Drought	   Treaty:	   In	   International	   Law,	   Canada	   has	  
Withered,	  GLOBE	  AND	  MAIL	  (Mar.	  29,	  2013,	  8:56	  AM),	  http://www.theglobeandmail.com/commentary/its-­‐not-­‐just-­‐the-­‐drought-­‐treaty-­‐in-­‐international-­‐law-­‐canada-­‐has-­‐withered/article10549743/.	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could	  be	   replicated	  on	   the	   international	   stage.28	  Of	   course,	   even	   the	  most	  diligent	  boosters	   of	   international	   legalism	   are	   forced	   to	   concede	   that	   (at	   least	   currently)	  there	   is	  no	   international	  executive	  akin	   to	   that	  existing	  within	   the	  domestic	   state;	  hence	  their	  frequent	  turn	  to	  culturalist	  arguments.	  The	  issue	  of	  legitimacy	  is	  crucial	  here,	  and	  points	  to	  the	  link	  between	  politics	  and	  the	  state,	  conceived	  not	  just	  as	  an	  institution	  exercising	  force,	  but	  one	  seen	  as	  authorized	  to	  use	  force.	  As	  Max	  Weber	  noted,	   a	   state	   is	   only	   a	   state	   if	   “its	   administrative	   staff	   successfully	   upholds	   the	  claim	  to	  the	  monopoly	  of	  the	   legitimate	  use	  of	  physical	  force	  in	  the	  enforcement	  of	  its	  order.”29	  A	  state	  exists	  when	  people	  (its	  citizens)	  accept	   its	  use	  of	   force.	  So	  the	  question	  becomes,	  could	  international	  tribunals	  come	  to	  be	  viewed	  as	  placing	  legit-­‐imate	  constraints	  on	  action,	  and	  their	  sanctions	  accepted	  as	  legitimate	  acts	  of	  force?	  In	  other	  words,	  can	  prosecutions	  for	  mass	  atrocity	  foster	  political	  legitimacy?	  Under	  what	  conditions?	  What	  kind	  of	  legitimacy?	  In	  other	  words,	  are	  such	  trials	  necessari-­‐ly	  democratizing?	  Or	  can	  they	  foster	  authoritarian	  legitimacy	  as	  well?	  And	  does	  this	  legitimizing	  function	  occur	  as	  a	  result	  of	  such	  trials	  being	  “just,”	  or	   is	  the	  relation-­‐ship	  between	  justice	  and	  political	  legitimacy	  contingent?	  Can	  unjust	  trials	  foster	  po-­‐litical	  legitimacy?	  The	   state’s	  monopoly	   on	   force	  works,	  when	   it	   does,	   because	   it	   is	  widely	   ac-­‐cepted.	  Where	  it	  is	  not,	  we	  see	  failed	  states	  and	  civil	  wars.	  For	  law—domestic	  or	  in-­‐ternational—to	  have	  any	  impact	  on	  mass	  political	  violence,	   it	  must	  be	  accepted	  as	  legitimate.	  That	  requires	  two	  conditions:	  trials	  must	  be	  considered	  “just”	  and	  they	  must	  be	  considered	  politically	  effective.	  Whether	  such	  conditions	  apply	  can	  only	  be	  determined	  contextually.	  There	  is	  no	  universal	  answer	  to	  these	  questions.	  The	   two	  books	  under	  consideration	  here	  each	  address	   the	   legitimacy	  of	  war	  crimes	   trials	   in	   their	  own	  way.	   In	  so	  doing,	  each	  calls	   into	  question	   the	  optimists’	  account	  of	  the	  trajectory	  of	  transitional	  justice,	  without	  embracing	  the	  anarchic	  un-­‐derstanding	   of	   international	   justice	   characteristic	   of	   the	   realists.	   Allan	   Ryan,	   in	  
Yamashita’s	  Ghost,	  offers	  a	  gripping	  and	  meticulous	  reconstruction	  of	  what	  can	  only	  be	  described	  as	  a	  gross	  miscarriage	  of	  justice,	  while	  Charles	  Anthony	  Smith,	  in	  The	  
Rise	  and	  Fall	  of	  War	  Crimes	  Trials,	  offers	  a	  sobering	  long-­‐term	  account	  of	  the	  history	  of	  criminal	  prosecutions	  for	  mass	  atrocities,	  arguing	  for	  the	  priority	  of	  politics	  over	  law	  in	  that	  history.30	  Both	  books	  reveal	  the	  deeply	  and	  intrinsically	  political	  nature	  of	   trials	   for	   mass	   atrocity,	   but	   both	   argue	   (implicitly	   in	   Ryan’s	   case,	   explicitly	   in	  Smith’s)	  that	  politics	   in	  such	  trials	  operates	  in	  tension	  with,	  even	  in	  opposition	  to,	  justice.31	  This,	  I	  would	  suggest,	  is	  mistaken.	  I	  would	  suggest	  rather	  that	  justice	  is	  not	  so	  much	  the	  antithesis	  of	  politics,	  as	  it	  is	  one	  form	  that	  politics	  can	  take.	  
Yamashita’s	  Ghost	  is	  in	  many	  ways	  a	  wonderful	  book.	  It	  offers	  a	  griping	  narra-­‐tive	  of	  General	  Tomoyuki	  Yamashita’s	  trial	   in	  Manila	   in	  the	  fall	  of	  1945	  for	  crimes	  
                                                            	   28.	  	   See	  generally	  ROBERT	  H.	  BATES,	  PROSPERITY	  AND	  VIOLENCE:	  THE	  POLITICAL	  ECONOMY	  OF	  DEVELOPMENT	  (2001).	  	  	   29.	  	   MAX	  WEBER,	  ECONOMY	  AND	  SOCIETY	  54	  (1978).	  	   30.	  	   ALLAN	  A.	  RYAN,	  YAMASHITA’S	  GHOST:	  WAR	  CRIMES,	  MACARTHUR’S	  JUSTICE,	  AND	  COMMAND	  ACCOUNTABILITY	  (2012);	   CHARLES	   ANTHONY	   SMITH,	   THE	   RISE	   AND	   FALL	   OF	   WAR	   CRIMES	   TRIALS:	   FROM	   CHARLES	   I	   TO	   BUSH	   II	  (2012).	  	   31.	  	   See	  generally	  RYAN,	  supra	  note	  30;	  SMITH,	  supra	  note	  30.	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committed	  by	  his	  troops	  during	  the	  battle	  for	  the	  Philippines.32	  The	  book	  reads	  like	  a	   legal	   thriller,	   in	   the	  very	  best	  sense	  of	   the	   term,	  and	  although	  most	   readers	  will	  already	   know	   the	   outcome	   of	   the	   trial,	   Ryan	   manages	   to	   generate	   a	   surprising	  amount	  of	  genuine	  suspense.	  In	  the	  end,	  of	  course,	  Yamashita	  was	  found	  guilty	  un-­‐der	  the	  then	  novel	  doctrine	  of	  command	  responsibility	  (a	  conviction	  ultimately	  up-­‐held	   by	   the	   United	   States	   Supreme	   Court)	   and	   then	   executed.	   Ryan	   leaves	   little	  doubt	  that	  he	  was	  wrongly	  convicted	  and	  that	  the	  doctrine	  of	  command	  responsibil-­‐ity,	  at	  least	  as	  outlined	  in	  the	  Yamashita	  case,	  was	  ill-­‐conceived.33	  Ryan	  enumerates	  the	  myriad	  flaws	  with	  the	  Yamashita	  case,	  including	  the	  du-­‐bious	   legitimacy	   of	   the	   authorizing	   order,	   the	   vague	   and	  unrealistic	   nature	   of	   the	  charges,	   the	   deep	   flaws	   in	   the	   rules	   of	   procedure	   and	   evidence	   followed	   by	   the	  court,	   and	   undue	   influence	   on	   the	   proceedings	   by	   General	   Douglas	   MacArthur,	  whose	  priorities	  were	  political,	  not	  judicial.34	  Taken	  together,	  these	  mean,	  on	  Ryan’s	  reading,	  that	  Yamashita	  was	  neither	  charged	  with	  reasonable	  crimes	  nor	  received	  a	  fair	   trial.35	   This	   was	   because	   General	   MacArthur	   had	   created	   the	   commission	   in	  such	  a	  way	  as	  to	  almost	  guarantee	  the	  outcome	  he	  wanted.	  “The	  emergence	  of	  the	  Tiger	   [Yamashita]	  as	  an	  honest,	   candid,	  and	  sincere	  military	   leader	  who	  had	  a	  co-­‐herent	   and	   credible	   account	   of	   his	   inability	   to	   prevent	   the	   atrocities	   of	   Japanese	  troops	   might	   have	   impressed	   the	   psychiatrists	   and	  motivated	   his	   lawyers,	   but	   it	  was	  not	  in	  MacArthur’s	  script.”36	  Unlike	  the	  International	  Military	  Tribunal	  at	  Nuremberg,	  whose	  authorization	  came	  from	  the	  London	  Charter,	  negotiated	  between	  the	  United	  States,	  Great	  Britain,	  France,	  and	  the	  Soviet	  Union,	  and	  eventually	  signed	  by	  an	  additional	  nineteen	  coun-­‐tries,	  Yamashita	  was	   tried	  before	  a	  Military	  Commission,	  convened	  under	   the	  sole	  authority	  of	  General	  MacArthur	  in	  his	  capacity	  as	  Supreme	  Commander	  of	  the	  Allied	  Powers,	  and	  effectively	  the	  sole	  ruler	  of	  postwar	   Japan.	   In	   that	  executive	  capacity,	  MacArthur	  issued	  orders	  on	  September	  24,	  1945	  to	  the	  U.S.	  Commander	  in	  the	  Phil-­‐ippines,	  General	  Wilhelm	  Styer,	   to	   appoint	   a	  military	   commission	   to	   try	  Yamashi-­‐ta.37	  Ryan	  makes	  it	  clear	  that	  MacArthur	  was	  within	  his	  authority	  as	  Commander	  of	  Allied	  Forces	  to	  constitute	  such	  a	  military	  commission.38	  He	  also	  makes	  it	  clear	  that	  such	  commissions	  are	  at	  best	   fragile	   institutions.39	  Because,	  unlike	  Courts	  Martial,	  they	  are	  not	  defined	  statutorily	  by	  Congress,	   their	   jurisdiction,	   remit,	   rules	  of	  evi-­‐dence,	  and	  procedure	  are	  all	  defined	  on	  a	  case-­‐by-­‐case	  basis	  by	  the	  convening	  mili-­‐tary	  commander.	  This	  creates	  enormous	  latitude	  for	  variation.	  If,	  by	  the	  early	  twen-­‐tieth	   century,	   the	   expectation	  was	   that	  military	   commissions	  would	  more	   or	   less	  follow	  the	  rules	   laid	  down	  for	  Courts	  Martial,	   there	  was	  no	  legal	  requirement	  that	  they	   do	   so	   and,	   under	  MacArthur’s	   convening	   orders,	   the	   Yamashita	   commission	  
                                                            	   32.	  	   See	  RYAN,	  supra	  note	  30.	  	   33.	  	   Id.	  at	  69-­‐71.	  	   34.	  	   See	  generally	  id.	  	   35.	  	   See	  id.	  at	  xii-­‐xiv.	  	   36.	  	   Id.	  at	  88.	  	   37.	  	   Id.	  at	  61.	  	   38.	  	   Id.	  at	  280.	  	   39.	  	   Id.	  at	  51-­‐58.	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was	  expressly	  freed	  from	  most	  ordinary	  due	  process	  regulations.40	  If	   the	   authorizing	   order	   created	   foundational	   problems	   for	   the	   Yamashita	  commission,	  according	  to	  Ryan,	  the	  actual	  charge	  was	  even	  more	  flawed.41	  MacAr-­‐thur’s	  order	  provided	  the	  only	  charge	  against	  the	  defeated	  Japanese	  general.	  Yama-­‐shita,	   it	   was	   alleged,	   “unlawfully	   disregarded	   and	   failed	   to	   discharge	   his	   duty	   as	  commander	  to	  control	  the	  operations	  of	  the	  members	  of	  his	  command,	  permitting	  them	   to	   commit	   brutal	   atrocities	   and	   other	   high	   crimes	   against	   the	   people	   of	   the	  United	   States	   and	   of	   its	   allies	   and	  dependencies.”42	   This	   proved	   to	   be	   “one	   of	   the	  most	  controversial	  aspects”	  of	  the	  entire	  case.43	  It	  seems	  reasonable	  to	  require	  mili-­‐tary	  commanders	  to	  control	  their	  troops,	  but	  as	  Ryan	  points	  out,	  the	  term	  “permit-­‐ting”	  raises	  more	  questions	  than	  it	  answers.44	  Does	  it	  require	  an	  act	  of	  affirmative	  permission,	   such	  as	  an	  order?	  Or,	  was	   it	   sufficient	   that	   the	   “failure”	   to	   control	  his	  troops	  created	  circumstances	   in	  which	  atrocities	  could	  be	  committed?	  “The	  differ-­‐ence	  between	  these	  two	  readings	  is	  crucial.”45	  The	  former	  would	  mean	  the	  prosecu-­‐tion	  had	   to	  prove	  action	  or	  negligent	   inaction	  on	   the	  part	  of	  Yamashita,	  while	   the	  latter	  more	  or	  less	  made	  Yamashita’s	  guilt	  a	  foregone	  conclusion.	  “If	  proof	  of	  those	  acts	  [atrocities]	  was	  itself	  sufficient	  to	  prove	  the	  failure	  to	  control	  his	  forces,	  and	  if	  that	   failure	  was	   a	   ‘violation	   of	   the	   laws	   of	  war,’	   then	   it	  was	   hard	   to	   imagine	   that	  Yamashita	  had	  any	  defense	  whatever	  to	  MacArthur’s	  charge.”46	  In	  any	  event,	  it	  was	  this	   latter—essentially	   tautological—understanding	   of	   the	   doctrine	   of	   command	  responsibility	  that	  prevailed	  in	  the	  trial.	  Yamashita	  was	   able,	   during	   the	   trial,	   to	   demonstrate	   that	  most	   of	   the	  worst	  atrocities	  were	  committed	  by	  troops	  only	  recently	  placed	  under	  his	  command,	  that	  his	  command	  of	  those	  troops	  was	  only	  “tactical”	  and	  did	  not	  extend	  to	  disciplinary	  matters,	   that	   the	   atrocities	   were	   committed	   despite	   his	   orders	   for	   the	   troops	   in	  question	   to	  withdraw	   from	  Manila,	   and	   that	  he	   and	  his	  headquarters	  had	  already	  withdrawn	  to	  the	  mountains	  and	  were	  thus	  largely	  out	  of	  contact	  with	  the	  troops	  in	  question.	  He	  claimed	  to	  be	  entirely	  unaware	  of	  the	  atrocities	  being	  committed,	  and	  the	  prosecution	  was	  unable	  to	  provide	  any	  evidence	  to	  the	  contrary,	  merely	  arguing	  that	  the	  atrocities	  were	  so	  widespread	  that	  he	  must	  have	  known	  of	  them.	  This	  was	  an	  astute	  legal	  maneuver,	  as	  Ryan	  notes,	  but	  one	  that	  essentially	  changed	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  charge	  from	  “permitting”	  to	  “knowing,”	  even	  though	  the	  prosecution	  failed	  to	  actually	   demonstrate	   either	   permission	   or	   knowledge.47	   Despite	   this,	   Yamashita	  was	  convicted,	  based	  solely	  on	  his	  official	  military	  position	  as	  commander	  of	  Japa-­‐nese	  forces	  in	  the	  Philippines.	  This	  ran	  counter	  to	  the	  well-­‐established	  principle	  of	  legality	  that	  individuals	  can	  only	  be	  held	  accountable	  for	  what	  they	  do,	  or	  negligent-­‐ly	  fail	  to	  do,	  not	  for	  who	  they	  are.	  The	  prosecution’s	  case	  was	  essentially	  “that	  the	  
                                                            	   40.	  	   Id.	  at	  57-­‐58.	  	   41.	  	   Id.	  at	  62-­‐64.	  	   42.	  	   Id.	  at	  61.	  	   43.	  	   Id.	  	  	   44.	  	   Id.	  at	  62.	  	   45.	  	   Id.	  	  
	   46.	  	   Id.	  	  	   47.	  	   Id.	  at	  61-­‐65.	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command	  relationship	  alone	  was	  sufficient	  to	  convict	  the	  commander	  of	  marauding	  troops,	  because	  the	  crimes	  themselves	  were	  obvious	  proof	  that	  the	  commander	  had	  not	  prevented	  them.”48	  Although	  the	  court’s	  judgment	  was	  terse	  and	  did	  not	  outline	  its	  legal	  reasoning,	  the	  guilty	  verdict	  effectively	  confirmed	  this	  prosecution	  theory.	  These	  fundamental	  doctrinal	  problems	  were	  exacerbated	  by	  deep	  procedural	  flaws	  as	  well.	  MacArthur’s	  authorizing	  order	  “made	  it	  quite	  clear	  that	  no	  rules	  of	  ev-­‐idence	   whatever	   were	   to	   apply.	   Anything	   the	   commission	   wanted	   to	   consider—anything	  it	  thought	  might	  ‘be	  of	  assistance’	  or	  have	  ‘probative	  value’	  or	  ‘information	  relating	   to	   the	   charge’—it	   could	   consider.”49	   Hearsay,	   and	   even	   double	   or	   triple	  hearsay,	  was	  regularly	  allowed.	  Unauthenticated	  documents	  were	  entered	  into	  evi-­‐dence.	  Extraneous	  testimony	  of	  no	  direct	  relevance	  to	  the	  charge	  against	  Yamashita	  was	  rampant.	  Defense	  objections	  on	  all	  these	  grounds	  were	  regularly	  overruled.	  As	  an	  experienced	  litigator,	  Ryan	  is	  especially	  effective	  in	  dissecting	  these	  procedural	  flaws.	  He	  leaves	  the	  reader	  feeling	  that	  the	  only	  difference	  between	  the	  Yamashita	  trial	  and	  a	  Soviet-­‐style	  show	  trial	  was	  that	  Yamashita	  had	  a	  capable	  and	  dogged	  de-­‐fense	  team.	  Even	  if	  the	  defense	  failed	  to	  win	  any	  of	  its	  legal	  points,	  either	  before	  the	  commission	  or,	  ultimately,	  before	  the	  United	  States	  Supreme	  Court,	   it	  was	  at	   least	  able	  to	  call	  attention	  to	  these	  flaws	  and	  protest	  against	  the	  injustice	  of	  the	  trial	  as	  it	  was	  unfolding.	  Finally,	   Ryan	   stresses	   that	   the	   Yamashita	   commission	  was	   less	   a	   trial	   court	  than	   it	  was	  an	  organ	  of	  MacArthur’s	  executive	  authority.	  All	  of	   the	  officers	  on	   the	  commission	  (as	  well	  as	   the	  prosecution	  and	  defense	  counsel)	   in	  effect	  worked	   for	  MacArthur	   and	  were	   subject	   to	   his	   command	   authority.	   Although	   Ryan	   acknowl-­‐edges	  that	  “no	  evidence	  has	  ever	  come	  to	  light”	  proving	  direct	  communication	  be-­‐tween	  MacArthur’s	  headquarters	  and	  the	  commission,	  he	  makes	  it	  plain	  that	  there	  are	   strong	   circumstantial	   grounds	   for	   suspecting	   that	   such	   improper	   communica-­‐tion	  in	  fact	  did	  take	  place.50	  On	  several	  key	  procedural	  issues	  concerning	  uncorrob-­‐orated	  affidavits	  and	  granting	  a	  continuation	  so	  the	  defense	  could	  prepare	  for	   last	  minute	  supplemental	  charges	   filed	  by	  the	  prosecution,	   the	  court	  changed	   its	  mind	  mid-­‐trial;	   a	   move	   almost	   certainly	   “dictated”	   by	   MacArthur.51	   MacArthur	   made	  known	  his	  desire	  for	  a	  swift	  conviction	  and	  received	  daily	  transcripts	  of	  the	  trial.	  “It	  is	   therefore	  only	  natural	   to	   surmise	   that	  his	  headquarters	  was	   advising	   the	  untu-­‐tored	  generals	  on	  the	  elements	  of	   the	  crime	  or	  even,	   less	   formally	  but	  equally	   im-­‐properly,	  telling	  them	  that	  the	  evidence	  was	  sufficient	  for	  a	  conviction.”52	  For	  Ryan,	  these	  failings	  not	  only	  fatally	  undermined	  Yamashita’s	  trial;	  they	  al-­‐so	  helped	  create	  a	  deeply	   flawed	   legacy	  as	  well.53	  Because	  of	   the	  precedential	  na-­‐ture	  of	  law,	  specific	  doctrinal	  developments	  can	  have	  lasting	  impacts,	  for	  good	  or	  ill.	  Ryan’s	  ultimate	  point	  is	  that	  the	  doctrine	  of	  command	  responsibility	  came	  into	  the	  
                                                            	   48.	  	   Id.	  at	  171.	  	   49.	  	   Id.	  at	  98.	  	   50.	  	   Id.	  at	  238.	  	   51.	  	   Id.	  	   52.	  	   Id.	  	   53.	  	   Id.	  at	  xiv.	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world	  with	  serious	  birth	  defects.54	  The	  American-­‐led	  successor	  tribunals	  at	  Nurem-­‐berg	  tried	  their	  best	  to	  transform	  the	  almost	  absurdly	  vague	  and	  tautological	  doc-­‐trine	   articulated	   by	   the	   Yamashita	   commission	   into	   a	   workable	   legal	   category,	  mainly	   by	   requiring	   proof	   that	   commanding	   officers	   were	   at	   least	   aware	   of	   the	  atrocities	   they	  were	   supposed	   to	   prevent.55	   Yet	   in	   the	   end,	   Ryan	   is	   right	   that	   the	  whole	  notion	  of	  command	  responsibility	  is	  in	  tension	  with	  notions	  of	  individual	  ac-­‐countability	  under	  law.	  It	  creates	  a	  kind	  of	  functional	  culpability	  of	  officers	  for	  acts	  they	  may	  or	  may	  not	  be	  able	  to	  prevent.	  The	  ultimate	  problem	  is	  that:	  	   The	   doctrine	  was	   not	   only	   created	   in	   the	   Yamashita	   case;	   it	   was	  created	   specifically	   for	   Yamashita.	  And	   it	  was	   created	   in	  order	   to	  convict	  him,	  by	  devising	  a	  link	  previously	  unknown	  in	  the	  law	  that	  attributed	  to	  him	  crimes	  that	  he	  did	  not	  order,	  did	  not	  participate	  in,	   very	  probably	  did	  not	  know	  about,	   and	  almost	   certainly	   could	  not	  have	  done	  anything	  about	  even	  if	  he	  had	  known	  of	  them.56	  	  	  Consequently,	  Ryan	  concludes,	  “Yamashita’s	  ghost	  lingers	  in	  the	  law.”57	  In	  this	  conclusion,	  Ryan	  is	  almost	  surely	  right.	  And	  his	  call	  for	  a	  more	  coher-­‐ent,	  more	   relevant,	   and	   above	   all,	  more	   plausible	   understanding	   of	   command	   re-­‐sponsibility	   is	  very	  well	   taken.	  Yet	  Ryan	   is	  perhaps	  more	   idealistic	  about	  what	   in-­‐ternational	  law	  is	  or	  can	  be	  than	  is	  warranted	  by	  the	  historical	  record.	  “Sometimes,”	  he	  notes,	  “a	  trial	  is	  more	  than	  a	  process	  of	  reaching	  a	  verdict.	  Sometimes	  it	  is	  thea-­‐ter	   and	   spectacle,	   catharsis	   and	   redemption.”58	   This	   is	   a	   crucial	   point,	   one	  which	  Ryan	  himself	  often	   seems	   to	   forget.	   For	   instance,	  he	   laments	   that	   the	  prosecution	  added	  a	  supplemental	  bill	  of	  particulars	  the	  day	  before	  the	  trial	  was	  to	  start	  listing	  fifty-­‐nine	  new	   incidents	  of	   atrocity	   to	  be	   considered	   in	   the	   case.59	  He	   is	   critical	  of	  this	  not	  only	  because	   the	  already	  overburdened	  defense	  was	  not	   given	  additional	  time	  to	  prepare—a	  perfectly	  valid	  point—but	  also	  because:	  	   It	   is	   hard	   to	   imagine	   .	  .	  .	  what	   the	  prosecution	  hoped	   to	  prove	  by	  the	  new	  allegations	  that	  it	  could	  not	  prove	  with	  the	  original	  ones,	  other	   than	   to	  demonstrate	   in	   lengthy	  detail	  what	  everyone	   in	   the	  room—indeed,	  everyone	  in	  the	  Philippines—already	  new:	  that	  ex-­‐tensive	   and	  horrific	   crimes	  had	  been	   committed	  by	   Japanese	   sol-­‐diers	  on	  civilians	  and	  prisoners	  of	  war.60	  	  Yet	  catharsis	  and	  articulating	  publically	  the	  tragic	  stories	  “everyone”	  already	  
                                                            	   54.	  	   Id.	  at	  338-­‐41.	  	   55.	  	   In	  addition	  to	  Ryan’s	  book,	  also	  see	  Kevin	  Jon	  Heller,	  The	  Nuremberg	  Military	  Tribunals	  and	  the	  Origins	  of	  International	  Criminal	  Law	  262-­‐71	  (2011).	  	   56.	  	   Ryan,	  supra	  note	  30,	  at	  339.	  	   57.	  	   Id.	  at	  341.	  	   58.	  	   Id.	  at	  88-­‐89.	  	   59.	  	   Id.	  at	  90.	  	   60.	  	   Id.	  at	  92.	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knows	  is	  precisely	  the	  point	  of	  such	  transitional	  justice	  trials	  and	  is	  the	  very	  source	  of	   their	   political	   power.61	   The	  prosecution,	   in	   calling	   a	  myriad	   of	   eyewitnesses	   to	  testify	  to	  atrocities	  that	  Yamashita	  neither	  ordered	  nor	  participated	  in,	  was	  never-­‐theless	  giving	  voice	  to	  the	  victims,	  and	  in	  this	  respect,	  was	  perhaps	  ahead	  of	  its	  time	  in	  understanding	   the	  psychological	   and	  political	   significance	  of	   cases	   such	  as	   the-­‐se.62	   For	   an	   American	   government,	   seeking	   to	   grant	   independence	   to	   the	   Philip-­‐pines	  on	   terms	   that	  would	  keep	   its	   former	  protectorate	  well	  within	   the	  American	  sphere	  of	  influence,	  such	  cathartic	  theater	  was	  arguably	  indispensable.	  It	  created	  a	  narrative	  of	  shared	  suffering,	  in	  a	  way	  that	  MacArthur’s	  paternalistic	  “I	  shall	  return”	  could	   not.	   This	  was	   especially	   crucial	   given	  America’s	   own	   history	   of	   committing	  atrocities	   in	   the	   Philippines.63	   In	   this	   respect,	   MacArthur	   may	   have	   understood	  something	  of	  the	  true	  purpose	  of	  the	  trial	  that	  Ryan,	  thoroughgoing	  lawyer	  that	  he	  is,	  does	  not.	  If	  Ryan	  believes	   that	   international	   law	  can	  be	  haunted	  by	  past	   injustices,	  he	  also	  seems	  to	  believe	  that	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  exorcise	  the	  ghost	  of	  politics	  from	  inter-­‐national	   law	  and	   condition	   it	   to	  operate	   in	   a	  more	   autonomous,	   and	  hence	   fairer,	  manner.	  Charles	  Anthony	  Smith	  is	  not	  so	  sure	  law	  can	  be	  purged	  of	  politics.64	  Trac-­‐ing	  the	  trajectory	  of	  war	  crimes	  trials	  (again	  in	  the	  broadest	  sense	  of	  the	  term)	  from	  
Charles	  I	  to	  Bush	  II,	  as	  the	  subtitle	  of	  his	  book	  puts	  it,	  Smith	  seeks	  to	  analyze	  the	  in-­‐terplay	  of	  politics	  and	  justice.65	  He	  explicitly	  sets	  these	  up	  as	  independent	  variables,	  each	  potentially	  at	  work	  in	  war	  crimes	  trials,	  but	  neither	  reducible	  to	  the	  other.	  His	  question	   is	   “whether	  human	   rights	   tribunals,	   either	   ad	  hoc	  or	   standing,	   are	  prod-­‐ucts	  of	  the	  high	  call	  to	  justice	  or	  instead	  are	  tools	  utilized	  in	  the	  normal	  dimensions	  of	  political	  processes	  and	  political	  consolidation.”66	  Justice,	  he	  defines	  as	  a	  combina-­‐tion	  of	  substantive	  (fair	  charges)	  and	  procedural	  due	  process	  (fair	  trial	  procedures),	  aimed	  at	  deterrence	  and	  retribution.67	  Politics,	  he	  defines	  in	  these	  transitional	  set-­‐tings	  as	  “political	  consolidation	  here	  mean[ing]	  the	  effort	  at	  maintaining	  and	  solidi-­‐fying	  the	  newly	  secured	  or	  defended	  control	  over	  the	  institutions	  of	  government.”68	  Smith	  sees	  an	  almost	  cyclical	  trend	  in	  the	  history	  of	  war	  crimes	  prosecutions,	  from	  an	  early	  phase	  characterized	  as	  almost	  purely	  political,	  with	  the	  consolidation	  of	  new	  or	  renewed	  authority	  driving	  the	  proceedings,	  to	  a	  phase	  after	  World	  War	  II	  where	   due	   process	   norms	   came	   into	   the	   foreground,	   to	   a	   more	   recent	   return	   to	  more	  purely	  political	  proceedings	  (or	  blocked	  proceedings).	  As	  he	  puts	  it:	  	   When	  taken	  either	  individually	  or	  considered	  as	  a	  whole,	  these	  tri-­‐bunals	  seem	  to	  be	  undertaken	  in	  order	  to	  accomplish	  political	  con-­‐
                                                            	   61.	  	   See,	  e.g.,	  MARTHA	  MINOW,	  BETWEEN	  VENGEANCE	  AND	  FORGIVENESS:	  FACING	  HISTORY	  AFTER	  GENOCIDE	  AND	  MASS	  VIOLENCE	  (1999);	  MARK	  J.	  OSIEL,	  MASS	  ATROCITY,	  COLLECTIVE	  MEMORY,	  AND	  THE	  LAW	  (1999).	  	  	   62.	  	   See	  ANNETTE	  WIEVIORKA,	  THE	  ERA	  OF	  THE	  WITNESS	  (Jared	  Stark	  trans.,	  2006).	  	   63.	  	   See	   generally	  PAUL	   A.	   KRAMER,	   BLOOD	   OF	   GOVERNMENT:	   RACE,	   EMPIRE,	   THE	   UNITED	   STATES,	   AND	   THE	  PHILIPPINES	  (2006).	  	  	   64.	  	   See	  SMITH,	  supra	  note	  30.	  	   65.	  	   Id.	  	   66.	  	   Id.	  at	  6.	  	   67.	  	   Id.	  at	  7-­‐8.	  	   68.	  	   Id.	  at	  8.	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solidation	   rather	   than	   to	   ensure	   a	   proper	   dispensation	   of	   justice.	  The	   international	   community	   moved	   the	   concept	   of	   war	   crimes	  tribunals	  along	  a	  path	  of	   jurisprudential	  development	   that	  meant	  each	  successive	  iteration	  moved	  closer	  to	  delivering	  an	  instrument	  for	  the	  dispensation	  of	  justice.69	  	  	  The	   “war	   on	   terror”	   has,	   on	   Smith’s	   account,	   interrupted	   and	   perhaps	   re-­‐versed	  this	  trend	  toward	  greater	  “justice”	  in	  war	  crimes	  trials,	  causing	  a	  reversion	  “to	  political	  consolidation	  and	  expediency	  as	  the	  primary,	  perhaps	  sole,	  function	  of	  the	  tribunals.”70	  The	  reason	  for	  this	  is	  that	  there	  has	  been—and	  probably	  can	  be—no	  clear	  vic-­‐tory	  in	  the	  war	  on	  terror,	  and	  for	  Smith,	  justice	  flows	  from	  victory.	  “[I]n	  the	  absence	  of	   clear	  political	  winners	  or	   losers,	  war	   crimes	  prosecutions	   are	   simply	  not	   feasi-­‐ble.”71	  Where	  the	  outcome	  is	  negotiated,	  or	  where	  there	  is	  a	  political	  stalemate,	  tri-­‐als	  will	  either	  not	  happen	  at	  all	  (e.g.,	  Northern	  Ireland),	  or	  be	  quite	  limited	  in	  scope	  (e.g.,	  Argentina),	  or	  be	  replaced	  by	  alternative	  semi-­‐judicial	  but	  non-­‐punitive	  mech-­‐anisms	  like	  truth	  commissions	  (e.g.,	  South	  Africa).	  The	   seemingly	   obvious	   counter	   to	   Smith’s	   argument	   is	   the	   creation	   of	   the	  permanent	  ICC,	  which,	  following	  the	  lead	  of	  the	  ad	  hoc	  tribunals	  for	  Yugoslavia	  and	  Rwanda	   created	   in	   the	  1990s,	   has	   very	   strong	  due	  process	  protections,	   both	   sub-­‐stantive	  and	  procedural,	  and	  which	  appears	  to	  be	  operating	  independently	  of	  victo-­‐ry	  conditions	  in	  any	  of	  the	  conflicts	  it	  has	  addressed.	  (One	  sees	  this,	  for	  instance,	  in	  the	  indictment	  of	  Sudan’s	  President,	  Omar	  Bashir).	  Smith’s	  counter	  to	  this	  position	  is	   to	  point	  out	   that	   the	   ICC	  has	   concentrated	  virtually	   all	   of	   its	   attention	  on	  weak	  states	   from	  the	  global	   south,	  and	   “completely	  avoiding	  any	  engagement	  about	   the	  behavior	  of	  the	  Western	  states	  during	  the	  conflicts	  affiliated	  with	  the	  so-­‐called	  War	  on	  Terror.”72	  The	  doctrine	  of	  complementarity,	  which	  was	  justified	  as	  a	  way	  of	  en-­‐suring	  that	  prosecutions	  would	  be	  the	  work	  of	  people	  most	  directly	  involved	  to	  the	  extent	  possible,	  has	  served	  instead	  to	  preclude	  international	  prosecutions	  of	  pow-­‐erful	  state	  actors.	  Because	  such	  states	  invariably	  have	  functioning	  legal	  systems,	  ca-­‐pable,	   at	   least	   in	  principle,	  of	   investigating	  and	  prosecuting	  war	   crimes	  and	  other	  political	  atrocities,	  the	  ICC	  denies	  it	  has	  jurisdiction.73	  Thus,	  according	  to	  Smith,	  jus-­‐tice	  is	  a	  “luxury”	  that	  is	  dependent	  upon	  political	  victory	  for	  its	  viability.74	  Smith’s	   skepticism	   toward	   war	   crimes	   trials	   is	   thus	   more	   sweeping	   than	  Ryan’s,	   and	   seems	   to	  me	   to	   be	   quite	   persuasive	   on	   its	   own	   terms.	   Yet	   like	   Ryan,	  Smith	  sees	  perhaps	  greater	  antagonism	  between	  justice	  and	  politics	  than	  in	  fact	  is	  the	  case.	  If	  the	  optimists	  naively	  see	  justice	  as	  producing	  positive	  political	  outcomes	  quasi-­‐automatically,	   the	   pessimists	   tend	   to	   see	   an	   irreducible	   contradiction	   be-­‐tween	  political	  and	  legal	  imperatives.	  But	  what	  if	  law	  is	  simply	  one	  form	  that	  poli-­‐
                                                            	   69.	  	   Id.	  at	  266.	  	  	   70.	  	   Id.	  	   71.	  	   Id.	  at	  277.	  	   72.	  	   Id.	  at	  286.	  	   73.	  	   Id.	  at	  286-­‐90.	  	   74.	  	   Id.	  at	  15.	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tics	  can	  take?	  What	  if	  legal	  justice	  is	  not	  a	  luxury	  to	  be	  indulged	  in	  when	  politics	  has	  previously	   achieved	   its	   instrumental	   goals	   (consolidation)	   through	   other	   means,	  but	  rather	  is	  one	  specific	  means	  for	  achieving	  those	  goals?	  To	  me,	  the	  tendency	  to	  treat	  politics	  as	  the	  antithesis	  of	  law,	  and	  to	  treat	  politicized	  trials	  as	  necessarily	  be-­‐coming	  “show	  trials”	  seems	  to	  be	  mistaken.	  Law	  is	  a	  form	  of	  politics,	  not	  just	  in	  the	  obvious	  sense	  that	  it	  is	  based	  on	  stat-­‐utes	  and	  treaties	  created	  through	  political	  processes,	  but	  in	  the	  more	  specific	  sense	  that	  trials	  are	  political	  acts;	  certainly	  the	  kinds	  of	  war	  crimes	  and	  human	  rights	  tri-­‐bunals	  under	  consideration	  here	  are	  deeply	  and	  inevitably	  political.	  The	  question	  is	  what	  kind	  of	  politics	  they	  pursue.	  And	  here,	  I	  would	  suggest,	  the	  answer	  tends	  to	  be	  contextual.	   There	   are	   circumstances	  where	   the	   kind	   of	   due	   process	   fairness	   both	  Ryan	   and	   Smith	   see	   as	   essential	   is	   politically	   useful,	   and	   there	   are	   other	   circum-­‐stances	  where	  it	   is	  not.	  This,	   in	  turn,	  hinges	  on	  legitimacy.	   In	  some	  circumstances,	  due	  process	  fairness	  serves	  a	  powerful	  legitimating	  purpose,	  at	  least	  in	  the	  eyes	  of	  those	  staging	  the	  trial,	  if	  not	  necessarily	  those	  of	  the	  people	  being	  prosecuted.	  This	  was	   the	   case	   with	   Nuremberg.75	   In	   other	   contexts,	   legitimacy	   comes	   from	   other	  sources,	  for	  instance	  the	  revolutionary	  will	  of	  the	  people,	  in	  which	  case	  due	  process	  becomes	  superfluous.	  The	  ICC	  may	  not	  prosecute	  the	  powerful,	  but	  there	  can	  be	  lit-­‐tle	  doubt	   that	   those	  whom	   it	   does	  prosecute	  will	   benefit	   from	  very	   generous	  due	  process	  provisions,	  because	  the	  ICC	  has	  virtually	  no	  other	  source	  of	  legitimacy.	  Jus-­‐tice	  in	  war	  crimes	  trials	  needs	  to	  be	  understood,	  not	  as	  the	  antithesis	  of	  politics,	  but	  as	  one	  of	  its	  forms.	  	  
                                                            	   75.	  	   For	  the	  disjuncture	  between	  Allied	  intent	  and	  German	  reception	  at	  Nuremberg,	  see	  Devin	  O.	  Pen-­‐das,	  The	  Fate	  of	  Nuremberg:	  The	  Legacy	  and	  Impact	  of	  the	  Subsequent	  Nuremberg	  Trials	  in	  Postwar	  Ger-­‐
many,	   in	   REASSESSING	   THE	   NUREMBERG	   MILITARY	   TRIBUNALS:	   TRANSITIONAL	   JUSTICE,	   TRIAL	   NARRATIVES,	   AND	  HISTORIOGRAPHY	  249	  (Kim	  C.	  Priemel	  &	  Alexa	  Stiller	  eds.,	  2012).	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